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COMMENTS
Unemployment Compensation in Louisiana-
Benefits, Contributions, Eligibility Requirements,
Disqualification Provision, and Judicial Review
The unemployment compensation program is a part of the
social legislation which was prompted by the intense desire for
economic security which prevailed after the mass unemployment
of the depression of the 1930s.' The federal government pro-
1. Hirsch, The Louisiana Employment Security Law, in 16 WEST'S LouISIANA
STATUTES ANNOTATED xlv (1951). For a detailed treatment of the developments
which led to the enactment of legislation aimed at economic security, see Witte,
A Historical Account of Unemployment Insurance in the Social Security Act, 3
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 157 (1936).
[4481
1959] COMMENTS
vided an "inducement" for the states to adopt unemployment
compensation programs by imposing a three percent tax on pay-
rolls while allowing employers within a state a ninety percent
offset for taxes paid into an approved state fund.2 Consequently,
by June of 1937, all forty-eight states, along with Alaska and
Hawaii, had adopted unemployment compensation laws.8
The Louisiana legislature reacted quickly to the federal "in-
ducement" and passed the Louisiana Unemployment Compensa-
tion Law in 1936. 4 This Comment is intended to deal primarily
with the eligibility and disqualification provisions of the Louisi-
ana statute5 and the jurisprudence interpreting them. However,
an occasional reference to the laws of other states for purposes
of comparison is thought to be desirable. Likewise, a brief treat-
ment of employer contributions and the benefits payable is in-
cluded in order to assist the reader in fully appreciating the
problems involved in the primary subject matter of the paper.
BENEFITS"
The precise amount of benefits payable to an individual in
Louisiana depends on his earnings during that quarter of his
base period7 in which he earned the most wages. He is entitled
to a weekly benefit amount equal to 1/20th of his total wages for
insured work during the highest quarter of the base period, pro-
vided, of course, that the maximum to be drawn is $35.00 per
2. 49 STAT. 639 (1935) now incorporated into INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3301
et seq.
The United States Supreme Court used this "inducement" language in rejecting
the argument that this tax was an unconstitutional means of coercing state legisla-
tion in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
3. AARON, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION AND THE LAW 553 (1957).
4. La. Acts 1936, No. 97. The legislature acted under the authority of LA.
CONST. art. XVIII, § 7, which provides that the legislature may establish a system
of unemployment compensation.
5. LA. R.S. 23:1471-1713 (1950).
6. Id. 23:1592, as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 382, which increased the
minimum weekly benefit from $5.00 to $10.00 and the maximum weekly benefit
from $25.00 to $35.00. Previously the claimant could earn up to,$3.00 a week
without reporting that income to have it deducted from his benefits. This amount
of permissible nonreportable earnings has been increased to $5.00 per week. Id.
23:1593, as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 382.
7. The individual's "base period" is defined as "the first four of the last five
complete calendar quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual's
benefit year." Id. 23:1472(4). A "benefit year" begins "with the first day of the
first week with respect to which the individual first files a claim for benefits . . . ,
and thereafter the one-year period beginning with the first day of the first week
with respect to which the individual next files a claim for benefits after the
termination of his last preceding benefit year; provided, that at the time of
filing such a claim the individual has been paid wages for insured work required
under R.S. 23:1600(5)." Id. 23:1472(6).
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week.8 If $600.00 were earned during the best quarter, the week-
ly benefit would be 1/20th of that amount, or $30.00. There-
fore, the worker who was earning $200.00 a month before becom-
ing unemployed would receive about $120.00 a month. In addi-
tion, he could earn another $5.00 a week without reporting it,
this giving him a non-taxable income of $140.00 a month, where-
as he would otherwise have been earning only $200.00 a month
subject to taxation and the other expenses of working. Thus the
necessity for elaborate safeguards in the form of eligibility re-
quirements and disqualification provisions is readily evident.
The duration of benefits is also based on prior earnings. Dur-
ing a benefit year a claimant may receive 28 times the weekly
benefit amount, or he may receive 40% of wages paid him for
insured work during the base period, whichever is less.9
TAX CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPERIENCE RATING
The unemployment compensation tax is paid solely by the
employer; no part of the tax whatsoever is permitted to be shift-
ed to the employee. 10 The Louisiana tax is basically 2.7% of the
annual wages for insured employment paid by the employer."
The tax was evidently set at this figure to take full advantage
of the offset provision of the federal legislation.1
2
Although the maximum state tax is 2.7%, it is not fixed at
that figure. Stable employment and resistance to benefit claims
are encouraged by allowing the employer a reduced rate of taxa-
tion if he has a favorable experience rating.8  Under the pres-
ent formula' 4 a favorable rating can be achieved and maintained
by having few compensation claims charged to the employer's
record. As fewer layoffs occur in the employer's business, fewer
payments will be made to his former employees; consequently
fewer benefit payments will be attributed to the employer's rec-
8. See note 6 supra.
9. LA. R.S. 23:1595 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 382. A worker
earning $200.00 a month during his base period would have probably earned
around $2400.00, of which 40% is $960.00. On the other hand, 28 times his weekly
benefit amount, $30.00, is $840.00, which is less than $960.00. Therefore, he would
receive the $30.00 for 28 weeks. However, if the hypothetical claimant had earned
$700.00 in his highest quarter, with a $2000.00 total earnings for the base period,
his weekly benefit, $35.00, times the full 28 weeks would amount to $980.00.
40% of his total base pay is only $800.00; therefore he would receive $35.00 per
week for 22 weeks with a final check of $30.00 in -the 23d week.
10. LA. R.S. 23:1531 (1950).
11. Id. 23:1532, 1534.
12. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
13. LA. R.S. 23:1536(6) (1950). See also id. 23:1535.
14. Id. 23:1536(6) (a-i).
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ord by the agency. The lowest tax currently permissible in Lou-
isiana is .1% of insured wages. 15
The statute provides for emergency situations when the fund
becomes dangerously low.'6 If such an emergency occurs, the tax
of those employers enjoying a favorable experience rating can
be increased to build the fund back up to the required mini-
mum. Thus if benefits are awarded on the basis of unjustified
claims with the result that the fund is depleted to the danger
point, employers with favorable experience ratings are apt to ex-
perience an economic injury which they are powerless to avoid.
Many employers can save themselves a great deal of money
by considering the facts surrounding each discharge or layoff
and protesting timely in proper cases. Such close attention and
prompt action by employers will benefit the public as a whole,
since lower prices will be enjoyed when the full 2.7% tax is not
figured into the cost of goods and services. Claimants with legi-
timate claims will also benefit from the assured continued exist-
ence of the fund when the drain of unjustified payments is re-
moved. It is highly probable that many businessmen throughout
the state are unaware of their right to protest payments charge-
able to their accounts, and if they are aware of the right, prob-
ably do not know what circumstances render a claimant ineli-
gible or disqualified. Ordinarily, 7 without an adversary to con-
test a claimant's contentions, the agency has only a claimant's
self-serving statement to pass upon his right to benefits.
ELIGIBILITY AND DISQUALIFICATIONS -
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
An important distinction between eligibility and disqualifica-
tion rests in the length of time for which benefits may be denied
under the two sections. If a claimant is ineligible, he is denied
benefits for any week in which the condition which imposed the
ineligibilty continues to exist.'8 Thus, if a claimant is unable
15. Id. 23:1536(7).
16. Id. 23:1540(A-E). If the fund drops below 8%, but more than 7% of
the total payroll of all employers for the 12 months period ending on the com-
putation date, then those employers enjoying less than 2.7% rate of taxation will
have their rate raised .3%. If the fund falls below 7% but above 6% of the total
payroll such employers will have their rate increased .6%. If the fund goes below
6% of the payroll, all rates will be increased to 2.7%. Of course, under no cir-
cumstances will the state tax be raised over 2.7% of the annual payroll.
17. Since the number of claims processed daily are many and the personnel
available to investigate them are relatively few, it would appear ,to be impossible
for the agency to check with the previous employer on every claim.
18. Cf. LA. R.S. 23:1600 (1950).
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to work because of illness, he is considered ineligible for benefits
during any week in which the illness precludes his ability to
work.19 On the other hand, a disqualification usually lasts until
a certain condition, unrelated to the initial disqualifying circum-
stance, is fulfilled.2 0  For example, the claimant 'who was dis-
charged from his last job because of misconduct connected with
his work is disqualified until he has, subsequent to the disquali-
fication, earned ten times the weekly benefit amount for which
he was eligible.2
1
Burden of Proof of Eligibility
Since the Board of Review has the authority to prescribe the
rules to be followed in the fact finding procedure 22 and has pro-
moted a relaxed and informal atmosphere in administrative
hearings, the burden of proving eligibility does not occupy the
position of importance that it would were the facts being de-
termined by the judiciary. Nevertheless, there are conflicting
views as to who has the burden of showing the elements of eligi-
bility. One line of authority maintains that the burden rests on
the claimant,23 while the other view is that there is a presump-
tion of eligibility when the individual files a claim.
24
The language in Chapman v. Division of Employment Se-
19. Ibid. See also id. 23:1600(3).
20. Id. 23:1601(1-3). However, the "labor dispute" disqualification does not
end with the occurrence of a specified event. Id. 23:1601(4). Neither does the
general observation apply to those disqualifications listed in id. 23:1601(5-8),
which deal with specific situations.
21. Id. 23:1601(2). In reference to the misconduct disqualification: "Such
disqualification shall continue until such time as the claimant (a) can demonstrate
that he has been paid wages for work equivalent to at least ten times his weekly
benefit amount following the week in which the disqualifying act occurred and
(b) has not left his last work under disqualifying circumstances." The same dura-
tion provision is included in the voluntary quitting disqualification, id. 23:1601 (1),
and the refusal of suitable work disqualification, id. 23:1601(3).
22. The appeal tribunals and the Board of Review are the sole fact-finding
bodies. It appears that they may, on their own initiative, call for evidence, and
even affirmatively seek it in order to reach a sound decision. Cf. id. 23:1634,
1631. These tribunals are not bound by the formal rules of evidence.
23. Department of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 36 So.2d
496 (1948) Poulsen v. Review Board of Indiana, 123 Ind. App. 297, 110 N.E.2d
746 (1953) Shannon v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 155 Ohio St. 53,
97 N.E.2d 425 (1951) ; Clinton v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889 (1947) ;
Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d 524,
25 A.L.R.2d 1071 (1951).
24. Hassey v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 162 Pa. Super.
14, 56 A.2d 400 (1948); Department of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 159 Pa. Super. 567, 49 A.2d 260 (1946) ; Bliley
Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super.
548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946) ; Clinton v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889 (1947).
See ALTMA.N, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 101-102 (1950).
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curity25 suggests that in Louisiana there is a compromise be-
tween the two above views. According to the Chapman case it is
incumbent upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case
showing entitlement to the benefits claimed. When a person
seeks to file a claim, certain questions pertaining to his eligibil-
ity are asked him. If his answers are favorable to his receiving
benefits and are accepted by the agency representative, at that
moment he apparently establishes a prima facie case of eligibil-
ity, and the burden of proving his ineligibility shifts to the party
attacking the claim.
The view requiring the claimant to establish a prima facie
case of eligibility is appealing because of its simplicity and ap-
parent effectiveness. The administrative and criminal penalties
for misrepresentation are severe enough to induce honesty.2 6 An
additional safety factor is found in the fact that his statements
are checked against agency records which will reveal any mis-
representation except as to ability to work and availability for
work. The fact that the employer may contest the claim is still
another safeguard against misrepresentation.
Rule of Construction
The Louisiana courts have generally agreed that the declara-
tion of public policy within the act 27 requires a liberal construc-
25. 104 So.2d 201, 203 (La. App. 1958) : "When he submitted his claim for
unemployment compensation it was incumbent upon him to establish a prima facie
case showing entitlement to the benefits claimed." The court then suggests that
the claimant can establish his prima facie case by his personal assertion of right
to benefits when it says: "(Hie can hardly do this [establish his prima facie case]
without taking the witness stand to substantiate his position." See also DIvisIoN
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE 40 (La. 1955), which
states: "A claimant's certification that he is available for work is accepted as
prima facie evidence of availability in the absence of facts to indicate unavail-
ability."
26. LA. R.S. 23:1601(8) (1950) : "An individual shall be disqualified for
benefits: (8) For the week, or fraction thereof, with respect to which he makes a
false statement or representation knowing it to be false, or knowingly fails to dis-
close a material fact in obtaining or increasing benefits, or thereby receives any
amount as benefits under this Chapter to which lie was not entitled, and for the
fifty two weeks which immediately follow such week. All benefits so received shall
be immediately due and on demand paid to the administrator for the fund, and
such individual shall not be entitled to further benefits until repayment has been
made." Id. 23:1711 provides that making such false statements or knowingly with-
holding a material fact shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not less than
$50.00 nor more than $200.00 and/or imprisonment not less than 30 days nor
more than 90 days.
27. Id. 23 :1471: "As a guide to the interpretation and application of this
Chapter, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic in-
security due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals and wel-
fare of the people of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general
interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to pre-
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tion of the statute in order to benefit unemployed individuals as
much as possible.28 It would seem that an overzealous applica-
tion of this rule would have the unfortunate effect of minimiz-
ing the safeguards set up by the legislature. It is doubtful that
the legislature intended for such a rule to be used to diminish the
effectiveness of these elaborate safeguards which are clearly de-
signed to prevent abuse of the program and to prevent the dimi-
nution of the incentive to work.
It is difficult to determine how much emphasis the courts of
Louisiana have placed on this rule of construction. Although the
rule has been mentioned in several cases, the courts have not in-
dicated what effect, if any, it had on the decisions.2 9 It has been
stated, however, that where the statutory provision is clear and
unambiguous, reference need not be made to the policy behind
the statute.30 The difficulty is that in very few unemployment
compensation cases is there a clear and unambiguous provision
in the statute with which to decide the case. It is to be hoped
that the Louisiana tribunals will not consider themselves bound
to interpret the statute on the superficial basis of this "remedial
legislation- liberal construction" rule. The most desirable ap-
proach would be to recognize realistically that the statute is di-
rected toward the dual objectives of (1) supplying benefits to
those who meet the requirements of the act while (2) preserving
the initiative to work. While the former can be categorized as
primary and the other as ancillary, it would seem that both are
equally important to the ultimate success of the whole program.
vent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing
force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social
security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life.
This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employ-
ment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during period of employment
to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing
power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The
Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good,
and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment of this
measure, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for
the benefit of unemployed persons."
28. Chapman v. Division of Employment Security, 104 So.2d 201 (La. App.
1958) ; Sewell v. Sharp, 102 So.2d 259 (La. App. 1958) ; Lacombe v. Sharp, 99
So.2d 387 (La. App. 1957) ; Burge v. Administrator, 83 So.2d 532 (La. App.
1955).
29. See note 28 supra.
30. Sheffield v. Heard, 92 So.2d 295, 296 (La. App. 1957). In this case the
claimant left her former employment to follow her husband to another city. The
court held that this was good cause for leaving, but that it was not connected
with the employment. After citing Articles 13 and 14 of the Civil Code, the court
stated: "When a law, therefore, is clear and free from all ambiguity, we are not at




The eligibility section requires that a claimant must have
been paid certain wages for insured work during his base
period.32 The term "wages" is defined essentially as "remunera-
tion for services. ' 33 "Insured work," according to the statute,
means "employment" for employers3 4 who are subject to the
law.3 5 By far the greatest exclusionary feature of the statute is
found in the definition of employment and its express provision
that certain classes of employees are outside that definition."
31. LA. R.S. 23:1600 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 521: "An un-
employed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week
only if the administrator finds that:
"(1) He has made a claim for benefits in accordance with the provisions of
R.S. 23:1621 and R.S. 23:1622 [apparently referring to filing requirements,
although Subsection 1621 appears to apply to employers who are therein required
to distribute forms and information pertinent to the program to his employees].
"(2) He has registered for work at, and thereafter has continued to report at,
an employment office in accordance with such regulations as the administrator
may prescribe. The administrator may, by regulation, waive or alter either or
both of the requirements of this Section as to such types of cases or situations
with respect to which he finds that compliance with such requirements would be
oppressive, or would be inconsistent with the purposes of this Chapter; but no
such regulation shall conflict with R.S. 23:1591 [requiring that all benefits be
payable only through employment offices].
"(3) He is able to work, and is available for work.
"(4) He has been unemployed for a waiting period of one week; provided
however, that after the unemployed individual has been unemployed for six con-
secutive weeks or longer he shall be eligible for benefits with respect to such week
of waiting period if he is not otherwise disqualified for benefits with respect to
such week under other provisions of this Chapter. No week shall be counted as a
week of unemployment for the purposes of this sub-section:
"(a) unless it occurs within the benefit year which includes the week with
respect to which he claims payment of benefits, provided that this requirement
shall not interrupt the payment of benefits for consecutive weeks of unemployment.
"(b) if benefits have been paid with respect thereto:
"(c) unless the individual was eligible for benefits with respect thereto as pro-
vided in this section and in R.S. 23:1601 [disqualifications], except for the re-
quirements of this sub-section and sub-section (5) of R.S. 1601 [disqualification
for benefits during week in which unemployment compensation benefits are re-
ceived from another state or from the United States].
"(5) He has during his base period been paid wages for insured work equal to
not less than thirty times his weekly benefit amount. For the purposes of this
subsection, wages shall be counted as 'wages for insured work' for benefit pur-
poses with respect to any benefit year only if such benefit year begins subsequent
to the date on which the employing unit, by which such wages were paid, became
an employer within the meaning of any provision of this Chapter."
The only change made by Act 521 of 1958 was in Section 4, wherein the in-
dividual is now allowed to receive benefits for the week of waiting if he remains
unemployed for six consecutive weeks provided he is not otherwise disqualified.
The wisdom of such a rule is questionable in that it would seem to encourage the
claimant to avoid employment especially immediately before the sixth week of
unemployment.
32. Id. § 5.
33. Id. 23:1472(20) (A-D).
34. Id. 23:1472(16).
35. Id. 23:1472.
36. Id. 1472(12) (A-H). The specific exclusions are accomplished by Sub-
section (F). In general terms these are (1) agricultural labor as defined in the
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The statutory definition of "employer" has the effect of ex-
cluding some persons who might meet the requirement of the
"employment" definition in that to be an employer, an employing
unit must have employed four or more persons during twenty
weeks of either the current or the preceding calendar year.37 An
employing unit may, however, elect to pay the tax on behalf of
its employees even though not required to do so, and, in this
event, employees of the electing unit are considered covered by
the act.88
Another requirement of eligibility is that the claimant must
have been paid wages for insured work during his base period
equal to thirty times his weekly benefit allowance.39 This rule
is apparently designed to prevent a claimant from working a few
months out of the year and living off the fund during the re-
maining months.
The statute further provides that in order to be eligible for
benefits the claimant must be "able to work" and "available for
work."'40 These two requirements merit individual treatment.
Able to Work
Although inability to work is often expressed in terms of
availability, 41 it appears that this requirement was intended to
refer primarily to the mental and physical capacity for work.
statute; (2) domestic servants; (3) certain seamen; (4) worker performing
services for certain relatives; (5) certain federal employees; (6) certain em-
ployees of other states; (7) most employees of the State of Louisiana; (8) em-
ployees of non-profit organizations; (9) insurance agents when paid solely by
commission; (10) workers performing services compensable under an employment
compensation program established by an Act of Congress; (11) casual laborers
not in the course of the employer's trade or business; (12) persons performing
services for organizations exempt from federal income taxes under certain condi-
tions; (13) servants of foreign governments; (14) servants of instrumentalities
wholly owned :by a foreign government under certain conditions; (15) employees
classified as student nurses or medical trainees under certain conditions; (16)
news agency delivery boys under 18 years of age; (17) real estate salesmen who
are paid solely by commission; (18) barbers when paid solely by commission.
37. Id. 23:1472(11) (A-F): "'Employer' means: (a) With respect to the
calendar year 1941 and each calendar year thereafter, any employing unit which
in each of twenty different weeks within either the current or the preceding
calendar year, whether or not such weeks are or were consecutive, has or had in
employment four or more individuals, not necessarily simultaneously and irrespec-
tive of whether the same individuals are or were employed in each such week ....
38. Id. 23:1573.
39. See note 31 supra, at subsection (5).
40. See note 31 supra, at subsection (3).
41. Louisiana: 3 P-H Soc. Sec. Tax Serv. 27,796 (.8) (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec.
429-BR-53) (1954) (claimant unable to work full time because of high blood pres-
sure held unavailable) ; Ibid. (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 278-BR-53) (claimant left
previous job because of nervousness, probably could not hold job very long, held
unavailable).
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The requirement probably reflects the fear that unemployment
compensation could become a form of health insurance. Never-
theless, the requirement is construed quite liberally in order to
prevent physically disabled persons from being denied benefits
if they can do any type of work.
42
Available for Work43
An exact definition of availability is not to be found in the
cases.44 The cases do, however, fit into several factual situa-
tions which usually result in a finding of unavailability. One of
the most frequently litigated fact situations involves the attempt
by the claimant to limit unreasonably his availability to certain
days, hours, and working conditions. 45 This situation arises fre-
quently in cases involving female claimants with children. 46
42. 3 id. 27,796(.11) (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 9-BR-46) (claimant's left arm
permanently injured, unable to do former work, held eligible because he is not in-
jured in such a manner as to make him totally unable to work).
43. The requirement that a claimant be available for work has been the sub-
ject of extensive study and legal writings. See ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK
(1950) for book length treatment of this area of unemployment compensation.
In addition to that work numerous law review articles have been devoted to the
question of availability. E.g., Freeman, Availability, Active Search for Work, 10
OHIO ST. L.J. 181 (1949) ; Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55
YALE L.J. 123 (1945) ; Williams, Eligibility for Benefits, 8 VAND. L. REV. 286
(1955).
44. Some courts of other states have concluded that no hard and fast rule is
possible, consequently availability in each case must be decided on the merits of
the facts. Department of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 36
So.2d 496 (1948); Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn.
449, 61 N.W.2d 526 (1953); Producers Produce Co. v. Industrial Commission,
291 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1956). Other courts reach much the same position by
stating a general rule that the availability requirement was designed to test the
current attachment of the claimant to the labor force, then proceeding to determine
on the merits of the case whether the claimant met the general test. Fleiszig v.
Board of Review, 412 Ill. 49, 104 N.E.2d 818 (1952) ; Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Comm. v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. App.
1953) ; Rex v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 183 Pa. Super.
442, 132 A.2d 363 (1957).
45. One Louisiana court of appeal stated in dicta that "for purposes of draw-
ing unemployment compensation employees cannot arbitrarily remove themselves
from availability for work by restricting their willingness to work to certain hours,
types of work, or conditions not usual or customary in the occupation, trade or
industry." Raborn v. Heard, 87 So.2d 146, 149 (La. App. 1956) (claimant held
available for work notwithstanding fact that she only applied for jobs similar to
her previous one; only two such manufacturers in the area; slack season).
46. The Louisiana appellate courts have not dealt squarely with the situation
in which a claimant restricted her availability because of need to care for children.
Taylor v. Administrator, 88 So.2d 486 (La. App. 1956) can be interpreted to
mean that if the record had shown the claimant to have limited her availability to
the hours from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., she would have been held to be unavailable.
The claimant first told the agency that she was limited to work during those
hours, but later under oath told the Board of Review that she had help at that
time so that no such limitation still existed. The Board of Review apparently
viewed this as a self-serving statement and imposed the ineligibility based on un-
availability; however, the court of appeal held that the record failed to reveal
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Often availability is an issue when there are labor union restric-
tions on the time, wages, and working conditions of claimants
who are union members.4 7 Frequently a claimant will lose his
job for non-disqualifying reasons, and will move to a place where
there is no market for his services. 48 A worker may be employed
in seasonal work and not be able to find other work during the
"off season.149  Claims are often filed by persons temporarily
laid off, but who fully intend to return to the old employer upon
recall.50 In contrast to the foregoing situations which usually
result in a determination of unavailability, Louisiana holds that
a claimant whose sincere religious beliefs preclude working on
certain days acts reasonably in refusing to work on those days
and is therefore available for work notwithstanding the avail-
ability restriction.51
that any such limitation existed and reversed the Board of Review decision.
TsE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE 41
(La. 1955) instructs that "the individual who restricts herself to day work only,
because she is unable to hire some one to care for her child except during the day,
is available for work if such work is generally performed in the area."
47. No appellate court decisions were found on the question of labor union
restrictions in Louisiana. However, an Appeals Referee held in 1621-AT-52 (re-
ported only in THE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT
GUIDE (La. 1955)) that .where claimant made himself available only for work at
$2.06 an hour (union scale) and only for work assigned to him by the union hiring
hall, he had unduly restricted his availability. The theory used was that the
legislature did not intend to establish a dual standard of availability for union
and non-union claimants; neither did it intend to vest such power over eligibility
requirements for unemployment compensation in labor unions. Accord, id. 1805-
AT-52, 3 P-H Soc. See. Tax Serv. 27,796(18) (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 326-BR-53)
(1954).
48. Many jurisdictions find the claimant unavailable for work where there is
no market in the area for services within the claimant's capabilities. Mills v. Re-
view Board, 96 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. App. 1951) ; Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. App. 1953);
Weiner v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 99 N.E.2d 57 (Mass.
1951). Louisiana apparently subscribes to this view, although the question has
not yet reached an appellate court. Cf. 3 P-H Soc. See. Tax Serv. 27,796(.6)
(La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 450-BR-53) (1954). See also DIVIsIoN OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE 41 (La. 1955), which states: "There
must be a reasonable possibility of securing the type of work for which he claims
he is available."
49. The Louisiana Employment Security Law directed that a study be made
of the problems involved in bringing seasonal workers under the protection of the
program. LA. R.S. 23:1596 (1950). Apparently this study has not been com-
pleted. It would seem that the necessary implication to be drawn from such a
provision is that until further legislation is enacted based on such a study seasonal
employees are not within the coverage of the law.
50. Waiting to be recalled by the previous employer is considered by the ad-
ministrative tribunals to be a restriction on availability which renders the claimant
unavailable. 3 P-H Soc. Sec. Tax Serv. 27,796 (.14) (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec.
297-BR-53, 684-BR-53) (1954).
51. Id. 27,796(.15) (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 114-BR-50) (1954) (claimant,
member of Seventh-Day Adventists, discharged for refusal to work on Saturday;
her religious beliefs forbade working on that day; she offered to work on Sunday
instead; held available for work since claimant was sincere in her beliefs).
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Pregnancy is often treated as an availability issue.52 There
is a disqualifying provision for pregnancy in the Louisiana stat-
ute, but this provision covers only a short period before and
after the birth of the child. 53 Consequently the availability of a
pregnant claimant may still be an issue when the unemployment
falls outside the time limits of the express disqualification. Since
the pregnant claimant would be capable of only limited types of
work and for only a limited time, it is questionable that she
should be considered available for work.54 This is especially true
in view of the fact that many employers apparently are reluctant
to hire pregnant applicants, even though they might be capable
of doing the work involved.
One of the most crucial issues in interpreting the availability
requirement is the question of whether the claimant has to be
actively seeking employment in order to be considered available
for work. Many jurisdictions require that a claimant in order
to be "available" must be independently searching for work.55 In
Louisiana the rule seems to be that the claimant need not go out
every day in search of work, but that he must be in some way
52. E.g., Alabama Mills Inc. v. Carnley, 44 So.2d 622 (Ala. 1949) ; Be Stein-
berg, 263 App. Div. 916, 32 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1942) ; Reese v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 423,
199 S.W.2d 569 (1947).
53. LA. R.S. 23:1601(6) (1950): "An individual shall be disqualified for
benefits: (6) if not otherwise disqualified under this Section, for the twelve weeks
prior to the week in which occurs the expected date of birth of a child of that
individual and for the six weeks following the week in which such child is born."
54. For a 1950 Board of Review decision it appears that the general rule is
that a pregnant woman is considered unavailable for work; however, she can by
proving that she is still able to work maintain her eligibility. ) P-H Soc. See. Tax
Serv. 27,796(.12) (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 50-BR-50) (1954). Such a rule ap-
pears to be open to criticism, however, since -the time for which claimant would
remain available for work is of necessity very short, with the result that few em-
ployers would hire her. There seems to be little difference between the pregnancy
situation and the situation in which the claimant is held to be unavailable while
awaiting recall by the former employer. See note 50 supra.
55. E.g., Department of Industrial Relations v. Wall, 41 So.2d 611 (Ala. App.
1949) (claimant did not apply to other plants in the area during the period of
the claim; held unavailable) ; Department of Industrial Relations v. Tomlinson,
251 Ala. 144, 36 So.2d 496 (1948) (claimant remained passive and waited for
work to seek him out; held unavailable) ; Ioew's Inc. v. California Employment
Stabilization Commission, 76 Cal. App.2d 231, 172 P.2d 938 (1946) (required to
be diligently seeking work) ; Claim of Jackson, 68 Idaho 360, 195 P.2d 344 (1948)
(refusal to go out and look for work -unavailable) ; Dwyer v. Appeal Board,
321 Mich. 178, 32 N.W.2d 434 (1948) (claimant only sought work 3 or 4 times
during long period of unemployment -unavailable).
Altman advocates a "guided, but active work search" in which he would re-
quire that the agency supervise the search for work. In the absence of such super-
vision, he would not impose the obligation to actively search for work on the
claimant. ALTMAw, AVAIrA ILITY FOR WORK 115 (1950). It would seem that
such a position would, as a practical matter, eliminate the requirement altogether.
since there are not-enough personnel available to provide such supervision.
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engaged actively in an independent search for work. 56
The lack of transportation to and from work opportunities
creates a question of availability. The Louisiana view is that
transportation is a personal problem, and if the claimant has no
means by which to get to work, he is unavailable for work. 7
It is generally agreed that a claimant should not be required
to make himself available for unsuitable work. For example, a
bookkeeper should not be declared ineligible due to unavailability
when he refuses to make himself available for work as a hod-
carrier. A Louisiana court of appeal has stated that the claim-
ant must make himself available only for suitable work in order
to preserve his eligibility.58 Since this interpretation of the avail-
ability provision is based on the refusal of suitable work dis-
qualification, the criteria embodied therein will probably be used
as a test for availability purposes. 59
Upon becoming unemployed, a claimant may reasonably re-
strict his availability to work similar to his previous job; but the
longer he remains unemployed, the more willing he should be to
accept less attractive work.60 The length of time permitted to
elapse before the suitability standards are lowered would vary
in each individual case according to the type of work involved,
the chances of securing such work, and the current economic sit-
uation. Such a theory is apparently in accord with the notion of
how an unemployed person would act if he were not assisted by
unemployment compensation. There is no indication that the
program was designed to preserve the economic and social stand-
ing of the individual. Rather it seems that the program is de-
signed merely to relieve the shock of the loss of that standing
and to allow a temporary period of relief during which the claim-
ant must make his own adjustments. Thus, if the claimant is
not willing to lower his suitability standards in order to assist
56. Smith v. Administrator, 95 So.2d 349, 352 (La. App. 1957). Accord, 3
P-H Soc. Sec. Tax Serv. 27,796(.20) (La. Ref. Dec. 3006-BR-53, aff'd, Bd. of
Rev. Dec. 598-BR-53) (1954).
57. Although there has been no decision rendered by a Louisiana appellate
court on the matter of lack of transportation, the Board of Review has taken the
position that transportation is a personal problem and the lack of it will render
the claimant unavailable for work. 3 P-H Soc. See. Tax Serv. 27,796(.6) (La.
Bd. of Rev. Dec. 450-BR-53, 691-BR-53, 394-BR-53) (1954).
58. Raborn v. Heard, 87 So.2d 146 (La. App. 1956).
59. See page 467 infra.
60. 3 P-H Soc. Sec. Tax Serv. 27.796 (.15) (Ref. Dec. 2498-AT-53, aff'd,
Bd. of Rev. Dec. 498-BR-53) (1954). In accord with the holding is id. La. Bd.
Rev. Dec. 499-BR-53. See also La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 798-BR-53, reported only in
DIvIsIoN OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUmE (La. 1955).
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in his own readjustment, there appears to be no reason to pay
him benefits.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Disqualification for Leaving Employment Without Good Cause
Connected With the Employment6'
Thereason prompting a disqualification based on voluntary
quitting is that if it were not for the claimant's own choice he
would be working in his former employment. Payment of bene-
fits when the employee voluntarily chose to leave his old job
could tend to encourage instability of employment, whereas the
statute seeks to stabilize employment as much as possible.
In considering this disqualification three issues are involved:
(1) whether there was a voluntary quitting, (2) if so, whether
it was with good cause, and (3) if both of the foregoing are
found, whether the good cause was connected with the work. If
the quitting is found to be involuntary, there is no need to con-
sider the other two issues; but if the quitting is found to be
voluntary, the claimant must then show that it was with good
cause and that the good cause was connected with the employ-
ment in order to avoid disqualification.
Disagreement over wages is always a potential source of the
voluntary quitting issue. Such a disagreement may be caused by
the failure of the employer to grant an increase previously
agreed on, by the rejection of a present demand for an increase,
or by a reduction in wages. In each of these instances the test
used by the Louisiana agency is whether the claimant acted rea-
sonably in quitting.6
2
In the only Louisiana appellate case dealing with the volun-
tary quitting issue63 the claimant first stated that he left because
he was denied a wage increase, but later declared that he left be-
cause of bad health. In affirming the Board of Review's disquali-
fication on the basis that the claimant left in fact because of
the denial of a raise, the court did not consider the possibility
61. LA. R.S. 23:1601(1) (1950): "An individual shall be disqualified for
benefits: (1) if the administrator finds that he has left his employment without
good cause connected with his employment."
62. DivisioN OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE 8
(La. 1955) : "The pertinent consideration is whether or not the worker acted
reasonably in quitting work, having in mind such general factors as policy and
what the normal worker would have done under the same circumstances."
63. Jenkins v. Heard, 92 So.2d 287 (La. App. 1957).
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that the claimant may have left with good cause connected with
the employment. Although the case may indicate that the Lou-
isiana courts will be hesitant in finding good cause when the
leaving is the result of a wage dispute, the case is such weak au-
thority for that proposition the probabilities are that the courts
will use the broader "reasonableness of the quitting" test when
squarely faced with the issue.
Other reasons which may furnish good cause for quitting are
undue risk to health, increases in work load without proportion-
ate increases in pay, unfavorable relations with other employees,
and extensive use of profanity by fellow employees when per-
mitted by the employer.14 It is submitted that good cause for
leaving should be found only in cases where the circumstance ob-
jected to existed to the extent that it unreasonably threatened
to upset the employee's peace of mind or posed a serious threat
to his health.
Factors considered by the Louisiana agency as bearing on
the employee's reasonableness in quitting are whether he gave
the work a fair trial or sought to remedy the situation by bring-
ing it to the attention of the employer before resorting to quit-
ting.6 5
Leaving work because of pregnancy is often treated as a
voluntary quitting issue. More appropriately, the question
should be dealt with under availability if the express statutory
disqualification does not apply. In Louisiana the individual is
expressly disqualified for benefits during the twelve weeks prior
to the birth of the child and also for the following six weeks."
An Iowa court held that where the claimant quit because she was
pregnant, the quitting was voluntary since "her condition was
due to her own deliberate, voluntary act, and choice .... Claim-
ant's case has some analogy to that of one who deliberately
maimed himself to unfit himself for work."6 7 Although the
64. Cf. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE
13-19 (La. 1955).
65. Id. at 5: "An important test of 'good cause,' therefore, is the reasonable-
ness of the worker's leaving, as measured by what the normal worker might have
done under similar circumstances. ...
"Most workers will not abandon a job until they have sought another solution
to their difficulties, by one or more of the following steps:
"(1) giving the work a fair trial;
"(2) seeking an adjustment of unsatisfactory work conditions by the em-
ployer. .. ."
66. See note 53 8upra.
67. Moulton v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 239 Iowa 1161, 1165,
34 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1948).
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analogy used is humorous, it appears that the approach is well
taken if pregnancy is to be considered as a voluntary quitting
issue. It seems difficult to say that pregnancy is connected with
the employment, so even if it were considered to be good cause,
this element would be lacking.
A distinction must be drawn between the case in which the
claimant quits of her own volition because of pregnancy and
where the employer requires that an employee leave after being
pregnant for a certain time.68 In the latter case the Louisiana
administrative tribunals apparently refuse to apply the volun-
tary quitting disqualification," but rather are likely to rule the
claimant ineligible due to unavailability. In the former case,
however, it would seem that the analogy set forth above would
require a finding of good cause not connected with the work,
thus resulting in disqualification.
In Pennsylvania, persons who lost their jobs while under
legal detention are considered to have left work voluntarily. 70 In
Louisiana, legal detention has been considered misconduct con-
nected with the work.71 However, it would seem that during the
period of detention his unavailability for work would be the
factor prompting a finding of ineligibility. Of course, upon his
release he would become available for employment, and then
either the disqualification for voluntary quitting or misconduct
might be used to deny benefits in most cases.
In Louisiana, domestic difficulties appear to be good cause
for leaving employment, but are not considered connected with
the work.7 2 This position was taken by a Louisiana appellate
court which held that a claimant who quit her job to follow her
husband to another town left voluntarily without good cause con-
68. App. Ref. 3152-AT-57, reported only in DIvISIoN OF EMPLOYMENT SECUR-
ITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE (La. 1955) : "In the instant case, the claimant
left her employment in accordance with the rules and regulations of the company
pertaining to maternity cases. The claimant had no alternative but to leave her
job in accordance with the rules and regulations which discontinue the employment
of an employee after the third month of pregnancy. Therefore, the disqualification
[voluntary quitting] should be removed."
69. Ibid.
70. Michalsky v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 163 Pa. Super.
436, 62 A.2d 113 (1948).
71. 3 P-H Soc. Sec. Tax Serv. 28,806(.19) (La. Bd. of Rev. Dec. 653-BR-53)
(1954).
72. Id. 27,811 (.10), which digests several decisions by the Board of Review




nected with the work and consequently imposed the disqualifi-
cation.73
Disqualification for Misconduct Connected with the Employ-
ment74
The misconduct disqualification rests on the premise that un-
employment due to the fault of the claimant should not be com-
pensated. In order to impose the disqualification, two elements
must be found, "misconduct" and "connection with the work."
The problem of defining misconduct first arose in Louisiana
in Burge v. Administrator75 where the claimant, a railroad con-
ductor, had allowed his train loaded with explosives to go
through a warning signal. In holding the claimant guilty of wil-
ful misconduct, the court of appeal quoted the appeal referee's
definition of misconduct,78 which was in agreement with the pre-
vailing view77 but for some unexplained reason did not refer to
it in disposing of the case. From the language used by the court
it can only be concluded that misconduct does not require wilful
misconduct, but does require something more than mere heedless-
ness or carelessness. A single deliberate violation of a reason-
able rule designed to insure safety of workers and property will
constitute misconduct.
In Lacombe v. Sharp78 the claimant, a nurse's aide, was re-
placed due to her failure to notify her employer of her expected
date of return from the last of several indefinite leaves of ab-
sence caused by family illnesses. After noting the claimant's
emotional stress during the absence, the court held that the fail-
ure to notify was "thoughtlessness" which fell short of miscon-
duct. It would seem, however, that failure to notify of the pro-
posed date of return would work such a hardship on the em-
ployer that the replacement of the employee would almost become
73. Sheffield v. Heard, 92 So.2d 295 (La. App. 1957).
74. LA. R.S. 23:1601(2) (1950): "An individual shall be disqualified for
benefits . . . (2) If the administrator finds that he has been discharged for mis-
conduct connected with his employment."
75. 83 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1955).
76. Id. at 534: "The term 'misconduct' has been defined as follows:
"'Wilful and wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in de-
liberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has
the right to expect of his employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree
or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or
to show intentional and substantial disregard of the employers' interest, or of the
employee's duties and obligations to his employer."
77. See note 80 infra.
78. 99 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1952).
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a necessity. Thd holding seems' to be* unjustified in, view of the
ease with which the employer could be notified. The court may
have been influenced by the employer's sympathetic attitude to-
ward the payment of benefits to, the, claimant. However, mere
acquiescence by the employer should not be deemed controlling,
since there are other interests which must also be protected.
In Sewell v. SharTP79 the court, of appeal adopted a definition
of misconduct which is partially in agreement with that. prevail-
ing in most jurisdictions.8s The rule as stated by the LoUisiana
court is: "Misconduct ... must be an act, of wanton disregard
of the employer's interests, a deliberate violation- of the employ-
er's rules, and a disregard of standards, of behavior which the
employer has the right to expect of his, employees." 8' (Emphasis
added.) The rule as expressed in other jurisdictions is not stated
donjunctively, and goes further to state "or carelessndss- or neg-
ligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpa-
bility, wrongful intent or evil design, or to shoW an intentional
and substantial disregard of the employer's interests' or of the
employee's duties and obligations to his employer." 2 The defi-
nition as stated in other jurisdictions is used by the administra-
tive tribunals iW Louisiana.8 3 It is not thought that the court in-
tended to change the disjunctive meaning of the, prevailing defi-
nition or to exclude negligence or carelessless. It is rather be-
lieved that under the facts of the Sewell case, which involved no
issue-of negligence, the court merely saw no need to express that
part of the definition.
No other Louisiana cases were found which attempted to
drafta definition of misconduct. However, a very recent case,
79. 102 So.2d 259 (Lax App. 1958). In this case the claimant's vacation
period was shifted due to sickness among fellow employees. She insisted on taking
th.e vacation at the time originally scheduled 'because her daughter Was sick and
required her- attention, during that period' The employer insisted that she wait
until later, but she refused the postponement, failed to come to work, and was
fired. The court held that this was not misconduct within tfie meaning' of the
term as defined by the court. The court viewed, the vacation as part of the con-
tract of employment, stating that the claimant has a right to insist that the com-
pany live up' to its obligation. However, the court indicated that each case must
be decided on its merits and that the insistence on the vacation as scheduled might
in some cases constitute misconduct.
80. See Annot.,.146 A.L.R, 243 (1943).
81. Sewell v. Sharp, 102 So.2d. 259, 261 (La. App. 1958).
82. See, e.g.,, Boynton Cab Co. v. Newbeck, 237 Wis. 249, 259,. 296 N.W. 636i
640 (1941), a leading case which set forth the same definition used by the Loui-
siana Appeal Referee. See note 76 supra.
83. DivisioN OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE 20
(La. 1955) ; 3 P-H Soc. Sec. Tax Serv. 27,806(.1) (La. Ref. Dec. 2796-AT-53,
aff'd, Bd. of Rev. Dec. 511-BR-53) (1955). See also note 76 supra.
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without reference to any definition, held that three incidents of
tardiness constituted misconduct.8 4 These facts probably consti-
tute "disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has
the right to expect" under the misconduct definition of the ad-
ministrative tribunal which appears to have been adopted by the
Sewell case.
In order to constitute misconduct within the definitions dis-
cussed above, the action of the employee would often, of neces-
sity, be connected with the employment. However, occasions
might arise where the alleged misconduct does not occur within
the scope of employment. In such cases the controlling factor is
whether or not such misconduct renders the individual unde-
sirable for employment.8 5
Apparently in an effort to strengthen the misconduct disqual-
ification further, the statute provides for the "aggravated mis-
conduct" doctrine. 86 If it is found that "such misconduct has im-
paired the rights, damaged or misappropriated the property of,
or has damaged the reputation of a base period employer, then
the wage credits earned by the individual with the employer shall
be cancelled and no benefits shall be paid on the basis of the
wages paid to the individual by such an employer." ' The pro-
vision has important possibilities, but has apparently not been
litigated in Louisiana. The doctrine prevents the employer from
suffering both the damage to his business through the employee's
misconduct and the damage to his experience rating through
payments of benefits to the guilty employee.
Before leaving the misconduct disqualification, it is essen-
tial to consider a rule of construction which was stated in Sewell
v. Sharp.ss In that case the court stated: "The term [miscon-
duct] should be construed in a manner least favorable to work-
ing a forfeiture so as to minimize the penal character of the pro-
vision."8 9 Since the disqualification is based primarily, if not
exclusively, on fault, it would appear that such a rule of con-
84. Chapman v. Division of Employment Security, 104 So.2d 201 (La. App.
1958).
85. Cf. DMSION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE
20 (La. 1955) : "Offenses outside the scope of the claimant's employment do not
constitute misconduct within the meaning of the law unless they bear such a re-
lationship to the worker's particular job as to render him unsuitable for employ-
ment."
86. LA. R.S. 23:1601(2) (1950).
87. Ibid.
88. 102 So.2d 259 (La. App. 1958).
89. Id. at 262.
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struction has no application where the question to be resolved is
the misconduct of the claimant. Although mitigating circum-
stances may well be considered in determining the issue of mis-
conduct, a further consideration of the nature of the disqualifica-
tion as a forfeiture is unjustified.
Disqualification for Refusal of Suitable Work"°
There are three ways in which a claimant may become dis-
qualified under the refusal of work provision. First, he might
fail to apply for available, suitable work when directed to do so
by the agency. Next, he might refuse an independent offer of
employment, such as an offer for re-employment by a base period
employer who would rather rehire than have benefit payments
charged against his experience rating. Finally, he might refuse
to return to his ordinary self-employment, if he has any.9 1
The statute provides guides for the determination of suit-
ability of work in individual cases. These are as follows: The de-
gree of risk involved to the claimant's health, safety, and morals;
his physical fitness for the job offered; his prior training, ex-
perience, and earnings; his length of unemployment; the pros-
pects of his securing work in the locality in his customary occu-
pation; and the distance of the available work from his resi-
dence. 92
The first of these criteria, the degree of risk to health, safe-
ty, and morals, is to a large degree self-explanatory. It would
seem that the fear of physical injury must be a real fear of sub-
stantial injury before work could be validly refused on that
basis.98 The second criteria, the physical fitness of the claimant
for the job offered, also appears to be self-explanatory.
Prior training, experience, and wages are closely related to
the prospect of securing his customary work in the locality.
These criteria provide justification for the theory discussed
90. LA. R.S. 23:1601(3) (1950) : "An individual shall be disqualified for bene-
fits: . . . (3) if the administrator finds that he has failed, without good cause,
either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed by the administrator
or to accept suitable work when offered him, or to return to his customary self-
employment (if any) when so directed by the administrator."
91. Ibid.
92. Id. 23:1601(3) (a).
93. Cf. App. Ref. Dec. 3678-AT-55, reported only in DIvIsION OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE (La. 1955), where the appeal referee
held that the claimant justifiably refused suitable work on the basis that there
was a labor dispute in progress which involved violence confronting the claimant
with a real fear of physical injury.
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under "availability," in which the range of suitable work be-
comes greater as the claimant is out of work longer.9 4 Thus the
emphasis placed on prior earnings, experience, and training
diminishes as the period of unemployment increases and the
chances of securing work similar to his prior employment in the
locality diminishes.
Union requirements of a fixed wage scale for union members
give rise to the application of the refusal of work disqualifica-
tion. It has been held that.work is suitable where the wages of-
fered are substantially comparable to those prevailing in the lo-
cality for the work in question, even though the claimant might
be required by -union rules not to accept work at the prevailing
rates.9 5 Such work at the prevailing wage scale is deemed suit-
able, notwithstanding the fact that the union claimant may be
subject to expulsion from the union for accepting the work at the
lower pay rates. Similarly, the fact that new work is at a non-
union shop does not render the work unsuitable for a union
claimant, even if acceptance would mean expulsion from the
union.96 The theory seems to be that the employer in such cases
is simply seeking labor and is not posing the resignation from
union membership as a condition of employment which would
render the work unsuitable. 97 The contra argument is that the
result is the same, a separation of the claimant from his union,
even though there is an expulsion for violation of union rules
rather than a forced resignation. The latter argument is force-
ful but cannot prevail in view of the alternative which would be
a dual standard of suitability for union and non-union claimants.
When the prior employer offers to re-employ the claimant in
order to protect his experience rating, the Louisiana agency uses
94. See page 460 supra.
95. App. Ref. Dec. 8-AT-53, reported only, in DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE. (La. 1955). In this case the claimant,
a union member, insisted on the union wage scale of $1.02 an hour and refused
an offer of employment at $.90 an hour after having been out of work for two
months. Held, disqualified for refusing suitable work offer; no dual standard of
suitability' for union and non-union workers.
96. Ed. of Rev. Dec. 715-BR-52, aff'ing, App. Ref. Dec. 4770-AT-52, reported
only in DIVIsION OF EMPLOYMENT' SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE (La.
1955), holding that where claimant was laid off of a union job and* offered other-
-wise suitable work on a non-union job, the mere fact that the new job was non-
union did not justify the refusal.
97. LA. R.S. 23:1601(3) (b) (1950) : "Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Chapter, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied
under this Chapter to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new
work under any of the following conditions: . . . (iii) if as a condition of being
employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign
from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization."
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the "genuineness of the offer" test in order to determine the
suitability of the offer. 98 The theory is that the termination of
the employment relation is indicative of a former unhappy rela-
tionship; thus the agency realizes the offer of re-employment
may be prompted by selfish motives, and requires that the offer
be "genuine." A genuine offer appears to exist only in the rare
event that no other claimant on the rolls is qualified to do the
work offered.9 9 Although the theory protects the claimant from
an offer of re-employment which is designed solely to disqualify
him, it would seem that the other criteria of suitability afford
adequate protection in this respect. If this observation is sound,
it would be a more desirable policy to allow the employer to pro-
tect his experience rating by rehiring the claimant. In that way
the claimant would again be productively employed, and the fund
(the public) would be saved the expense of paying him the
benefits.
In the only Louisiana appellate case'0° dealing directly with
the refusal of work disqualification, the claimant refused to re-
port for an interview when directed to do so by the agency. The
claimant had contacted the personnel manager of the firm offer-
ing the job and learned that the job only paid $.61 an hour,
whereas he had been previously earning $1.20 an hour. The
court affirmed the disqualification, saying that while the offer
may have turned out to be unsuitable, the claimant should have
gone to the interview and made his qualifications known, there-
by allowing the prospective employer to make an offer more com-
mensurate with his skills. The court specifically refrained from
a consideration of whether the wages involved were suitable for
the claimant. The case is authority for the rule that the claim-
ant must at least report for an interview upon referral, even
though the referral may appear unsuitable at the outset.
The Labor Dispute Disqualification0 1
The disqualification imposed on claimants who lost their jobs
due to a labor dispute is a very important one, which has been
98. DivisioN OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, POLICY AND PRECEDENT GUIDE .49-53
(La. 1955).
99. Id. at 52.
100. Richardson v. Administrator, 28 So.2d 88 (La. App. 1947).
101. LA. R.S. 23:1601(4) (1950): "An individual shall be disqualified for
benefits: . . . (4) for any week with respect to which the administrator finds that
his unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in active progress at the
factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed;
but such disqualification shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the
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dealt with many times in other states. 0 2 However, there are
practically no decisions interpreting this vital disqualification in
Louisiana. Since the problems posed by such a provision are
many and complicated, and since it would be mere speculation
to attempt to anticipate the interpretations which will be afford-
ed the disqualification by the Louisiana tribunals, a discussion
of this aspect of unemployment compensation is not thought to
be within the scope of this endeavor.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
When a claim is filed, the statute requires that notice be sent
to the last employer and all base period employers. 03 Upon de-
termination of the claim, notice of that decision is also sent to the
claimant, the last employer, and all base period employers.
104 If
benefits are denied, the reasons therefor are included in the
notice.
An appeal from the initial determination can be directed to
the appeal tribunal by any party who was entitled to a notice of
determination. 10 5 This appeal must be filed within seven days
after the dispatch of the notice of determination. 06 After af-
administrator that he is not participating in or interested in the labor dispute
which caused his unemployment. For the purposes of this Sub-section, if separate
branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate
premises, are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such
department shall be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other
premises.
102. The decisions:in this area have been treated by numerous articles in the
legal periodicals. See Bullitt, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 25
WAsi. L. REV. 50 (1950) ; Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dis-
pute" Disqualification, 17 U. Ciii. L. REV. 294 (1950) ; Notes, 12 ARK. L. REV.
123 (1957), 24 U. CiN. L. REV. 401 (1955), 35 U. DETROIT L.J. 392 (1958), 26
IND. L.J. 570 (1951). 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 108 (1955).
103. LA. R.S. 23:1624 (1950). Although notice of the filing is required to be
sent to all the base period employers, as a practical matter this is almost impos-
sible until the claim is processed by the agency in order to determine the identity
of the base period employers. During this process a determination is also rendered
as to eligibility. Thus it appears that the first notice to the base period employers
is received after a decision has been reached as to eligibility. Any earlier notice
would necessarily be based on the claimant's often inaccurate identification of his
base period employer. To delay the determination of eligibility until the agency
can identify and notify all base period employers would unduly delay benefit pay-
ments to those who have legitimate claims. Consequently compliance with this
statutory requirement would probably prove too great an administrative burden.
104. Id. at 23:1625. Mailing to the last known address of the persons listed
is considered sufficient notification.
105. Id. at 23:1629.
106. Only one case was found in which a late filing of the appeal was allowed.
In that case the claimant was apparently illiterate, and there was no one to
read' the determination to him. 3 P-H Soc. See. Serv. 29,509 (La. Ref. Dec.
2690-AT-53) (1954). In less extreme cases, it would appear that for administra-
tive reasons, late appeals will not be allowed.
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fording the parties a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing,
the appeal tribunal either affirms, modifies, or reverses the
agency determination. This decision is final unless an appeal is
initiated to the Board of Review within ten days of notification
by mail of the appeal tribunal's decision. 10 7
The appeal to the Board of Review is "of right" only when
the decision of the appeal tribunal was not unanimous or did not
agree with the staff decision. Where the Board denies an appeal
the decision of the appeal tribunal is considered to be the de-
cision of the Board for purposes of judicial review. The time for
filing for judicial review runs from the date of mailing the noti-
fication of the refusal of the Board to hear the case. 08
Final decisions of the Board of Review or appeal tribunal
and principles of law declared by them in arriving at those de-
cisions are binding upon the agency and appeal tribunals in sub-
sequent proceedings involving similar questions of law. How-
ever, if the administrator or any appeal referee has serious doubt
as to the correctness of any principle so declared, he may certify
the facts and the question of law involved to the Board, which
will allow all parties a hearing as to the law and then certify an
answer.1o9
The administrator or anyone who was a party to the proceed-
ing before the Board of Review can petition the district court
of the domicile of the claimant for a review of the Board's de-
cision. The other parties to the proceedings before the Board
of Review are made party defendants, and the administrator is
specifically deemed to be a party. The administrator is respon-
sible for filing a certified copy of the record of the case with
his answer or petition. Since the courts are not empowered to
take new evidence, a default judgment cannot be rendered
against the administrator when he fails to submit the certified
copy of the record.1 0 His opponent's remedy in that event would
be through mandamus proceedings or by way of a rule for con-
tempt."' Service as to all parties is initiated by leaving with
the administrator as many copies of the petition as there are
defendants. He will then send the other parties a copy by
registered mail, which is deemed to be service on them. 1 2
107. LA. R.S. 23:1630 (1950).
108. Ibid.
109. Id. 23:1633.
110. Waldsworth v. Heard, 84 So.2d 254 (La. App. 1955).
111. Ibid.
112. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
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The Louisiana statute has the usual provision that "the find-
ings of the Board of Review as to the facts, if supported by
sufficient evidence, and in the absence of -fraud, shall be con-
clusive, and the jurisdiction of the courts shall be confined to
questions of law." 118 Thus the courts are not empowered to hear
evidence, but they can remand the case with instructions to take
more evidence if they are dissatisfied with the record. The
statute was amended in 1958 to read "if supported by sufficient
evidence"'114 (emphasis added) from the previous wording "if
supported by evidence." 5 It is difficult to determine what the
legislature intended in adding the word "sufficient." The rule
was apparently well established under the previous wording that
the Board's finding of fact was conclusive if "supported by the
evidence," which was interpreted to mean "legal, competent, and
sufficient proof." 116 An argument which could be raised is that
the legislature was disturbed by the courts' holding that the
statute meant legal, competent, and sufficient evidence, since
such language could be taken to mean that formal rules of evi-
dence had to be followed in the administrative proceedings.
However, the courts have never imposed such a requirement on
the administrative tribunals, and the statute clearly provides
that the Board has the authority to establish its own procedural
rules, without conforming to the formal rules of evidence and
procedure. 11 On the other hand, the change may have been in-
tended as a thrust in the direction of the "substantial evidence
rule,"" 8 which serves to test the extent of judicial review of
facts in other administrative areas. Nevertheless, a glance at
the judicial decisions reviewing administrative findings indi-
cates an extreme reluctance on the part of the courts to question
the administrative conclusions as to facts; thus it is not thought
that the legislative addition of the word "sufficient" will change
the law in this area.
113. Ibid.
114. La. Acts 1958, No. 523.
115. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
116. Chapman v. Division of Employment Security, 104 So.2d 201 (La. App.
1958) ; Lacombe v. Sharp, 99 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1957) ; Jenkins v. Heard, 92
So.2d 287 (La. App. 1957); PRborn v. Heard, 87 So.2d 146 (La. App. 1956);
Burge v. Administrator, 83 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1955).
117. LA. R.S. 23:1631 (1950).
118. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 914 et seq. (1951), wherein the author
quotes from Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) : "Sub-
stantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Davis
quotes from another case, NLRB v. Columbia Enameling & Stamping Co., 306
U.S. 292, 300 (1939), which amplified the initial quotation above by stating:
"Substantial evidence . . . must do more than create a suspicion of the existence
472 [Vol. IXIX
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Although the courts' review of facts is restricted, they have
unlimited jurisdiction to review questions of law.119 It would
appear that at least one Louisiana court has confused the issue
of fact and law. It failed to recognize the distinction between
evidentiary facts and the legal consequences of those facts.120
While the courts cannot question facts as found by the Board if
supported by sufficient evidence, they should always be able to
determine the meaning of the law to be applied to those facts
and to review the application of the law.121 Thus, if the issue
were the suitability of a job referral, the court should accept
the findings of fact as stated in the record if they are supported
by sufficient evidence, but the court should itself decide the
meaning of the statutory provision on suitability applicable to
the facts presented.
Ordinarily an appeal by the employer or the administrator
contesting the payment of benefits to a claimant will not suspend
payment of benefits.122 However, if the decision awarding pay-
ment is subsequently reversed, the claimant must reimburse
those payments received unless the administrator waives reim-
bursement under the waiver provision of Act 531 of 1958.128 It
would appear that if the administrator waives the reimburse-
ment, no charge should be made to the employer's experience
of the act to be established. .. . It must be enough to justify, if the trial were
to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn
from it is one of fact for the jury." Davis summarizes the rule as follows: "Ob-
viously the test of reasonableness under the substantial evidence rule is unprecise
and susceptible of different application by different courts or even by the same
court in different cases. Any attempt to make the test more specific is likely to
be unprofitable." Id. at 915.
See also Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L.
REV. 1026 (1941).
119. Cf. LA. R.S. 23:1634 (1950).
120. Story v. Heard, 85 So.2d 275 (La. App. 1956) (court refused to review
a disqualification for leaving suitable employment).
121. Cf. Raborn v. Heard, 87 So.2d 146, 148 (La. App. 1956). It would seem
that the court in this case accurately stated the correct position to be taken by
the courts in reviewing Board decisions. "Generally, the jurisdiction of the review-
ing court is limited to questions of law. The findings of the administrative body
are ordinarily conclusive on the courts if supported by substantial evidence. But
the courts will not sustain a determination where the decision is supported by no
substantial evidence and to sustain it will ignore the plain provisions of the statute.
So also, a question of law is presented for review if the tribunal misapplied the law
as to the facts found by it." (Emphasis added.) This approach does not preclude
the court's giving due consideration to the construction placed on the statute by the
administrators. On the contrary, the principle has been announced'in Louisiana
in connection with unemployment compensation that the contemporary interpre-
tation of a statute by those charged with its enforcement should not be disre-
garded unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous. Motion Pictures Advertis-
ing Services v. Sharp, 101 So.2d 456 (La. App. 1958).
122. Cf. LA. R.S. 23:1635 (1950).
123. Id. 23:1713, as amended. La. Acts 1958, No. 531.
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rating for the amount waived. There is also a possibility that
the waiver provision of Act 531 will run afoul of the Louisiana
constitutional provision which denies the legislature the power
"to release or extinguish, or to authorize the releasing or extin-
guishment, in whole or in part, of the indebtedness, liability, or
obligation of any.., individual to the State." 124
The statute provides that no costs are to be assessed against
the claimant for filing a claim or for instituting an appeal within
the administrative level. 125 Neither are costs to be assessed
against a claimant who seeks judicial review unless the appeal
has been instituted frivolously. 26 It appears, however, that the
courts have either overlooked this provision or have chosen to
interpret "frivolously" to mean any appeal in which the claim-
ant fails to obtain a reversal in his favor. The frivolity provi-
sion has never been mentioned in an appellate court case, where-
as several claimants with questions of law not previously settled
by the judiciary have been assessed costs. 127 It would seem that
no appeal should be deemed frivolous unless the appeal clearly
had no chance of success in light of statutory provisions or of the
existing jurisprudence.
The statute further provides that the claimant may be repre-
sented by counsel or other duly authorized agent, but the amount
paid counsel for services must be approved by the administra-
tor.2 8 Since a person who is dependent on unemployment com-
pensation would be reluctant to engage an attorney to pursue
his claim, a provision for the payment of reasonable attorney's
fees by the administrator on behalf of a claimant who is suc-
cessful in an appeal would probably facilitate justice in most
cases.
CONCLUSION
It has been seen that the Louisiana Employment Security
Law has been before the Louisiana courts in comparatively few
cases. However, the recent increase in the number of court of
appeal cases in this area and the recent increase in benefits in-
dicate that the courts will entertain an ever-growing number of
124. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
125. LA. R.S. 23:1692 (1950).
126. Ibid.
127. Chapman v. Division of Employment Security, 104 So.2d 201 (La. App.
1958) ; Sheffield v. Heard, 92 So.2d 295 (La. App. 1957) ; Burge v. Administrator,
83 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1955).
128. LA. R.S. 23:1692 (1950).
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unemployment compensation cases. These future cases are likely
to be highly influential in determining whether the program will
be successful in Louisiana. It must be remembered that the very
foundation for unemployment compensation is the theory that
a fund can be built up during "good times" in order to pay
benefits during "bad times." It is significant that the program
has never been put to a severe test, although there have been a
few minor recessions. Nevertheless, a few states found them-
selves in difficulty during the relatively short recession of 1958,
even though there had been a long period of prosperity before
that time.129 Hence it behooves the Louisiana agency, admin-
istrative tribunals, and courts to do their part in protecting
the rights of future claimants to benefits during severe economic
conditions through a diligent application of the safeguards em-
bodied in the statute, while at the same time giving the statute a
fair interpretation assuring benefits to those who presently have
a lawful right to them according to the terms of the statute.
J. C. Parkerson
State Taxation of Private Interests in
Federally Owned Property
The framers of the American Constitution viewed their
handiwork as a union of sovereign states under a sovereign fed-
eral government.' Conceptually, the former are governments of
broad reserved powers, while the latter is one of delegated,
enumerated powers. 2 Although each of these governments is
supreme in its sphere of authority,3 the limits of these spheres
129. This information was taken from a statement made by R. C. Goodwin,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Employment Security, which was reported by
the Associated Press and published in the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate of
November 11, 1958. "Michigan had to borrow $113 million from the federal gov-
ernment to take care of its fund requirements. Reserves of several other states-
including Pennsylvania, Oregon, Delaware, Rhode Island, and West Virginia-
have dwindled to a point where they too may need federal loans."
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, par. 2; U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX-X, TnE FEDuEAuST
Nos. 32 (Hamilton), 33 (Hamilton), 36 (Hamilton), 45 (Madison), and 46
(Madison).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
3. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
1959]
